SRE:
ENB:
EPD:
OKE:
LNG:
WMB:
MPC (MPLX):
Sunday, August 17, 2025
Saturday, August 16, 2025
Intel -- August 16, 2025
The White House is a sideshow; Intel must decide what it wants to do; link here.
From the linked article:
Five months in and Lip-Bu Tan is already fighting for his job...
The identity question—whether Intel wants to be a chip designer, a manufacturer, or remain both of those things—was possible to gloss over in Tan’s early days as chief executive officer ...
Now, with tensions bubbling in Washington, D.C., and between Tan and his board, his lack of a long-term strategy has become much harder to ignore.
Tan might ultimately survive the D.C. blitz. But his indecisiveness in his relatively short time in the post has merely highlighted how deep Intel’s problems run. The company was once the undisputed king of advanced chip-making—in both design and manufacturing. But strategic missteps that began at least three CEOs ago have culminated in a company that has lost its manufacturing edge to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., and its chip-design edge to rivals such as Advanced Micro Devices — and even to one-time customers like Apple.
Tan’s predecessor, Pat Gelsinger, was ousted last year after his multiyear turnaround effort sputtered. Unsuccessful though it was, Gelsinger at least had a plan: spend hundreds of billions of dollars to build up Intel’s manufacturing capabilities, get back into the chip-making technology lead and start competing with TSMC. Gelsinger was appointed in February of 2021 and presented a detailed strategy for Intel’s revival a month later.
That plan might have had better chances if market forces didn’t work against Gelsinger—most notably a sharp, industrywide pivot to artificial intelligence computing that left Intel in the lurch. Data center budgets went to Nvidia’s AI chips, and not as much was being spent on Intel’s server central processing units.
The company’s annual revenue plunged by nearly a third over the last four years, while Nvidia’s sales are now double Intel’s at its peak.
All that has left Tan with the unenviable position of fixing problems he didn’t create. But his strategy so far seems little changed from that of his predecessor’s approach of trying to fix everything, all at the same time.
That is a tall order, especially given that Intel is still burning cash while its manufacturing side has lost $13.6 billion in the 12-month period that ended in June.
And the company made clear on its second-quarter call last month that its latest chip manufacturing process called 18A is going to be mainly used for its own internal products—meaning no major external customer has yet signed up to have Intel make its chips.
A logical way forward for Intel might be to break itself up, hiving off its manufacturing operations into a separate company from its chip-design operation. That would follow a longstanding industry trend where companies either specialize in manufacturing or designing chips, but rarely both.
Many of Intel’s recent struggles stem from a lack of boldness in shifting along with the market away from its bread-and-butter PC and server chips, be it into mobile-phone chips or AI chips. But Intel isn’t entirely a stranger to decisive moves: its decision to exit from the computer-memory business in the 1980s helped push it to focus on the CPUs that drove the PC revolution of that decade and beyond.
Tan isn’t a career Intel guy—he is the company’s first CEO who didn’t previously work there.
But both he and Intel’s board need some of the decisiveness of Intel’s storied CEO of the ’80s and ’90s, Andy Grove, who was known for saying “most companies don’t die because they are wrong; most die because they don’t commit themselves."
Friday, August 15, 2025
Understanding WBI Energy's Size & Scope -- August 15, 2025
Understanding WBI Energy’s Size & Scope
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WBI Energy is the regulated pipeline and storage subsidiary of MDU Resources, carrying:
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~3,800 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines
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Roughly 2.9 Bcf/day of transportation capacity
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Underground storage—among the largest naturally occurring fields in North America
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Financial contribution:
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In 2022, WBI Energy generated $35.3 million in profit (presumably operating income) .
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MDU’s regulated energy delivery earnings (which includes WBI plus utilities) were projected at $155–165 million for 2023 .
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Estimating Enterprise Value Using Comparable Metrics
In energy infrastructure deals, especially regulated pipelines, valuations typically rely on multiples such as EV/EBITDA.
A conservative range for such assets is roughly 8× to 12× EBITDA, which reflects the predictable, regulated cash flows.
Rough Estimate:
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Assumed EBITDA for WBI: Let’s start with the 2022 profit (~$35 million) as a proxy for EBITDA.
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Valuation Range:
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Low-end (8×): ~$280 million
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High-end (12×): ~$420 million
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This suggests a hypothetical valuation of $300–$400 million, assuming WBI is standalone and similarly structured to peers.
Additional Context That Could Adjust Valuation
Here are several factors that might drive WBI’s potential value up or down in the eyes of an acquirer like ONEOK:
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Growth Prospects
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WBI is actively expanding—investing $405 million from 2024–2028 in upgrades and growth projects .
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Continued capacity and storage utilization increases could justify higher multiples.
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Regulated Stability
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As a regulated utility-like asset, WBI offers low risk and reliable returns, which could command a valuation premium.
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Balance Sheet Considerations
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WBI had $235 million in debt outstanding against a $350 million note facility .
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Enterprise value calculations would incorporate such debt, impacting overall deal pricing.
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Strategic Fit for ONEOK
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If WBI strategically complements ONEOK’s footprint—e.g., filling geographic gaps or providing storage synergies—the acquisition could merit a premium multiple.
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Final Thoughts
While we lack an official valuation on WBI Energy, applying industry-standard multiples based on known profit figures suggests a base enterprise value around $300–$400 million. That said, strategic value, growth projects, and regulatory factors may push the price higher—potentially toward $500 million or more in a favorable acquisition scenario.
What The WSJ Thinks About The Ford Announcement -- August 15, 2025
Friday, August 15, 2025: what The WSJ has to say about the new Ford. Link here.
Doug Field sounded a lot like Elon Musk when unveiling Ford Motor’s strategy to compete against the rise of Chinese electric cars.
At an event this week in Louisville, Ky., Field detailed the thinking behind Ford’s affordable electric vehicle program, which promises a midsize pickup priced at around $30,000 in 2027.
His ambitious plan boils down to implementing hardcore engineering to take down costs, while keeping performance; and upending 100 years of manufacturing practices to go faster, including through more automation.
All of which rang familiar to anyone following Tesla’s announcement in 2023 to slash the cost of building its next-generation cars by 50%.
Ford Chief Executive Jim Farley is warning about the threat of Chinese rivals making more affordable EVs. He called this week’s announcement Ford’s new “Model T moment.”
In an industry known for hype and hyperbole, there is, perhaps, no single engineer who has been attached to more fantastical personal transportation projects in the past 20 years than Field. The Segway scooter, the Tesla Model 3, the Apple car. And, now, the Model T of tomorrow. Field is basically being asked to save the company from irrelevance—at least in the minds of Wall Street investors who think China has already won.
After Monday’s event, however, investors didn’t seem sold on Ford’s latest hype-mobile. Shares finished the day down slightly—not the sort of reaction one would expect for such a game-changer.
One factor in the apparent apathy may have been that Ford didn’t display an actual vehicle. Rather it showed video of employees supposedly looking at it off camera. (“That’s awesome,” one employee said.)
With regard to the Tesla Model 3:
The original price for the base Tesla Model 3 was advertised as $35,000. It was introduced in 2017, with production beginning in the same year and customer deliveries starting later that year.
While
the $35,000 base model was initially planned, Tesla initially focused
on higher-priced, more profitable versions due to production delays and
cash flow needs. The $35,000 base model is no longer available.
$35,000 in 2017 is equivalent in purchasing power to about $45,901.09 today, an increase of $10,901.09 over 8 years.
The $30,000 2027 Ford priced in today's (2025) dollars:
With a projected inflation rate of 2.2% in 2025 and 2.1% in 2026, the
likely cost today (2025) of something expected to cost $30,000 in 2027
would be approximately $28,750.60.
Thursday, August 14, 2025
Electricity Grid -- NY Times -- August 14, 2025
Perhaps I was just in a bad mood, or tired, or bored, or who knows what, but I thought this was the most scatter-shot article I've read in a long, long time. It almost looks as if the writers simply posted their notes / thoughts during the power grid conference they were attending with no editing -- sort of like a blog, and then posted it as a blog disguised as a New York Times story.
I'm linking it for the archives, but I wouldn't spend a lot of time on it.
The annual meeting of state utility regulators is typically a humdrum affair of dry speeches and panel discussions. But in November, the scene at the Marriott in Anaheim, Calif., had a bit more flash.
The conference’s top sponsors included the nation’s biggest tech companies — Amazon, Microsoft and Google. Their executives sat on panels, and the companies’ branding was plastered on product booths and at networking events. Even the lanyards around attendees’ necks were stamped with Google’s colorful logo.
Just a few years ago, tech companies were minor players in energy, making investments in solar and wind farms to rein in their growing carbon footprints and placate customers concerned about climate change. But now, they are changing the face of the U.S. power industry and blurring the line between energy consumer and energy producer. They have morphed into some of energy’s most dominant players.
They have set up subsidiaries that invest in power generation and sell electricity. Much of the energy they produce is bought by utilities and then delivered to homes and businesses, including the tech companies themselves. Their operations and investments dwarf those of many traditional utilities.
Wednesday, August 13, 2025
Daimler Benz Truck Manufacturing In Portland, Oregon -- August 13, 2025
From a reader, using Perplexity:
As of July 2025,
This decision is in response to a slowdown in new truck orders, particularly in the medium-duty, on-highway, and electric vehicle segments. Daimler Truck has not specifically announced cuts to its battery-electric vehicle (BEV) production in Portland, but the company has acknowledged a slowdown in new orders for BEVs as part of the broader market challenges.
In the second quarter of 2025, order intake for zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), including BEVs, declined compared to the previous year. However, the company continues to focus on developing and expanding its EV portfolio, and plans to introduce new electric truck models in the coming years.
Daimler also recently completed a $40 million expansion of its engineering facility at its Swan Island headquarters in Portland, which will house research projects related to battery-electric and hydrogen fueled vehicles.
Regarding the situation in Oregon
specifically:
- In January 2025, Daimler Trucks North America halted sales of large diesel trucks in Oregon due to the state's new Advanced Clean Trucks rule, which requires a certain percentage of new heavy trucks sold in the state to be electric. Daimler cited ambiguities in how Oregon would account for electric truck sales as the reason for the pause.
- Daimler later resumed diesel truck sales after clarification from the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, but the new rules will continue to limit the number of diesel truck sales in Oregon.
- Despite these regulatory challenges, Daimler had converted its existing Portland factory to manufacture all-electric Freightliner trucks in 2021.
In summary: While Daimler has
implemented production cuts and layoffs in Portland due to a
broader slowdown in truck demand, including the EV segment,
the company's commitment to EV production in the long term
seems to remain intact. They continue to invest in and develop
their electric truck portfolio and capabilities, including at
their facilities in Oregon.
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