Query: what was the spark that occurred 2016 - 2020 that was ignited the AI revolution in 2022 (post-Covid)?
Reply:
Query: what was the spark that occurred 2016 - 2020 that was ignited the AI revolution in 2022 (post-Covid)?
Reply:
Query: Industrial revolutions. The first industrial revolution was steam. The second industrial revolution was railway and much more. How long did the second industrial revolution last?
Query:
I would argue the current industrial revolution began after Covid -- Nvidia broke out from gaming to AI in 2001. When would you same the current AI revolution began? The second industrial revolution lasted 44 years; how long might the AI revolution last?
Reply:
Query:
The US has too much natural gas; the world not enough with the Iran War -- what's the major chokepoint getting US LNG to Europe, Asia? US pipeline grid (continental); the last mile LNG pipelines in Texas, Louisiana; the export terminals along the Gulf Coast; tankers; existing long-term contracts; something else?
Reply:
The War Powers Act is not specifically "enacted" by anyone. It simply takes effect by statute. The courts do not start the process, but the executive branch can be sued by a member of Congress if the member feels the administration is not abiding by the law. Historically, the courts do not get involved. The US Supreme Court considers this a political issue and they won't get involved; this is pretty much an ironclad issue for SCOTUS.
AI query: Is the euphoria over AMD, NVDA, MU similar to the euphoria over Lucent in 2000?
MIT Technology Review: how Lucent lost it. Link here.Tom Tunguz: Nvidia is not Lucent. Link here.
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Lucent Imploded 2000 - 2001
AI query: what were the key highlights of Lucent's financial report for the year 1999: market cap, free cash flow, debt, eps, revenue, revenue growth year-over- year.
Lucent, 1999:
Apple has a deep, multibillion-dollar partnership with Globalstar, initiated in 2022 to power the Emergency SOS via Satellite feature on iPhones. Through significant investments and prepayments exceeding $1.5 billion, Apple secured 85% of Globalstar's network capacity, utilizing it for satellite messaging and emergency services.
Amazon Leo is Amazon’s low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite broadband network, formerly known as Project Kuiper, designed to provide high-speed, low-latency internet to households, businesses, and governments worldwide. Utilizing over 3,000 satellites, it aims to connect underserved areas, with service options planned for in-flight Wi-Fi and direct-to-device connectivity.
Links: four important links below.
Micron could surge another 40%. Link here.
The queue for storage. Link here.
Largest fab being built in the US. Link here.
Revenue: google -- micron revenue quarterly history 5-year
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Micron vs Sandisk
AI prompt: I think it can be safe to say that Micron and Sandisk are not in direct competition. Though both are in the storage business, they are in different markets. Is that correct?
Reply:
| How AI changed tech stocks, in 1 chart |
![]() Data: Financial Modeling Prep; Chart: Emily Peck/Axios Memory chipmaker Sandisk is replacing workplace software maker Atlassian on the Nasdaq 100 index, Nasdaq announced late Friday. Why it matters: The small move is a big symbol of what has happened this year as the tech industry adapts to the AI boom. Zoom in: Software companies are getting crushed by the competition in the SaaS-pocalypse, while hardware makers are thriving.
The bottom line: AI has made software uncool and hardware the belle of the ball. |
From The Arizona Republic, April 5, 2026.
Arizona State University will develop its eighth Arizona “innovation zone,” an area that will be devoted to international science and collaboration, near the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. facility in north Phoenix.
The current seven Arizona "innovation zones":
ASU President Michael Crow called the $165 billion TSMC plant near Interstate 17 and Loop 303 the “single most important technological opportunity in Arizona since air conditioning.”
“We are going to concentrate an innovation district there that’s linked to this international science and technology community,” Crow said.
The university appointed Grace O’Sullivan as vice president of TSMC.
Partnership Initiatives, and she works closely with TSMC and semiconductor industry suppliers to address their needs for workforce, research and university partnerships.
O’Sullivan said she is working with Crow and other ASU leaders to design the innovation zone, called the International Science Zone.
“We really see Arizona as becoming that global landing spot,” she said about the area’s ability to attract international companies.
The innovation zone will give ASU an opportunity to create an advanced teaching and learning center and joint academic centers with international universities, O’Sullivan said.
The zone will also have space for startup incubation, which O’Sullivan said is a gap in the market for advanced manufacturing and technology companies. The zone could also include other educational entities like community colleges or K-12 schools, along with other facilities the community desires, like recreation.
“We want to create a holistic workforce development system,” she said.
The university will need “quite a bit of territory” for the zone and that it is “looking everywhere” for land but Crow did not confirm a specific location.
Crow said the university is moving at “flank speed” on getting the innovation zone going, a nautical phrase meaning as fast as the boat can go.
ASU has seven other “innovation zones,” which are designated areas where the university has operations alongside private businesses. Those locations include three nearby the main campus in Tempe: The Novus Innovation Corridor, ASU Research Park and SkySong in south Scottsdale.
The other Arizona innovation zones are the Discovery Oasis Health Futures Center near the Mayo Clinic in north Phoenix, the Phoenix Bioscience Core in downtown Phoenix, the ASU Mesa Center for Creative Technology in downtown Mesa, the ASU Polytechnic Innovation Zone in Mesa and the ASU West Valley Innovation Zone in west Phoenix.
Corina Vanek covers development for The Arizona Republic. Reach her at cvanek@arizonarepublic.com. Follow her on X @CorinaVanek.
Background:
Not only the largest natural gas power plant but the largest power plant, of any sort -- nuclear, coal, natural gas -- in the entire United States.
Wiki: list of largest US power plants.
SoftBank proposal:
AI prompt:
Alan Turing. Development of computers. Things don't happen in a vacuum (no pun intended). Things don't happen overnight. Specifically, 1937 was a pivotal year and not just with Turing. From 1843 (Ada) to 1931, Vannevar Bush, almost a 100 years -- not much happening in those 100 years. Then Tommy Flowers in 1935 -- valves / vacuum tubes. So you look back five to six years before that pivotal year. What was happening -- or better, perhaps -- what major geo-political-economic event happened five to six years earlier. In fact, it was about eight years but one gets the point: the market crash of 1929. I'm sure there are some observations / thoughts about those years ... 1929 to 1937 that brought us to that point. Thoughts?
Google Gemini:
Even without the wealth tax, I would prefer to live in Switzerland rather than in Norway.
The big problem is that the 1.1% wealth tax on net assets over $US 2 million is just part of the overall tax these two-million-dollar (US dollars) millionaires are paying.
Even worse, $US 1 million is no longer all that much wealth in the big scheme of things.
The big question is whether Norway has either a debt problem or a deficit problem:
Norway's wealth tax:
Norwegian wealth tax. Story reported in The Guardian. AI prompt and reply:
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Wealth Tax
If the wealth tax is a detriment to the economy in a country like Norway, one can only imagine how bad the wealth tax would be to a state like California who is at risk of a major deficit in any given year.
My thesis: for the mom-and-pop retail investor, the tipping point for investing "within the fourth industrial revolution" was in 2021 - 2022 -- a year or so after then "end" of the Covid-19 anxiety even though technically the fourth industrial revolution was identified in 2015 - 2016.
ChatGPT:
Yeah—that intuition tracks. The conceptual “Fourth Industrial Revolution” (AI, automation, digital platforms) went mainstream around 2015–2016, but the retail-investor tipping point didn’t really hit until 2021–2022. Different clocks were ticking for institutions vs. everyday investors. A few reasons why your timing feels right:
⸻
Why 2016 ≠ the retail tipping point
2016 was narrative-level adoption.
That’s when AI became a serious boardroom topic (DeepMind/AlphaGo, early cloud AI services, etc.). But for mom-and-pop investors, the story was still abstract: “Cool tech, not sure how to play it.” Public-market exposure was limited to broad tech names and semis.
Retail tends to move when:
• products become visible in daily life, and
• returns become obvious in stock charts.
Neither was true yet in 2016.
⸻
Why 2021–2022 was the tipping point
1. COVID changed investor behavior, not just tech adoption
Lockdowns did three huge things at once:
• Time: people had more time to learn markets
• Access: Robinhood/zero-commission trading went mainstream
• Psychology: markets felt “democratized” (GameStop, AMC, crypto)
This created a brand-new retail cohort that:
• was younger,
• more speculative,
• and much more willing to chase narratives (AI, EVs, space, quantum, etc.).
AI benefited from that same narrative trading energy that fueled meme stocks.
⸻
2. The tech finally crossed from “infrastructure” to “products people could feel”
Before 2021, AI mostly lived behind the scenes:
• ad targeting
• search ranking
• fraud detection
• logistics optimization
After COVID:
• recommendation engines, automation, and bots were suddenly everywhere
• then ChatGPT (late 2022) made AI personally tangible
That’s when retail investors went from:
“AI is a thing companies use”
to
“Oh wow, this changes everything.”
That emotional shift matters a lot in retail flows.
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3. NVIDIA as the retail “AI thermometer”
Retail investors don’t invest in systems—they invest in symbols.
NVIDIA became the symbol:
• clean story
• obvious revenue growth
• simple narrative: “AI runs on GPUs”
Once NVDA started ripping in 2023, it functioned like:
“Proof that AI isn’t just hype—this is how you get paid.”
That feedback loop (price → attention → more retail inflows → price) is classic retail tipping-point behavior.
⸻
4. Post-COVID narrative hunger
After:
• meme stocks cooled,
• crypto crashed,
• EV hype got messy,
retail investors were hungry for a new mega-theme that felt:
• transformative
• understandable
• not already “over” (psychologically)
AI checked all three boxes.
⸻
Why institutions moved earlier than retail (and always will)
Big money started positioning in:
• cloud,
• data centers,
• semis,
• ML tooling
years earlier—quietly. Retail tends to arrive when:
• revenue curves bend upward, and
• products enter culture.
That’s not stupidity—it’s just different incentives:
• institutions invest in capability
• retail invests in visibility
All four together created what feels like an overnight AI boom—but it was actually a slow fuse with a loud detonation.
⸻
Big-picture take (your instinct is strong here)
What you’re really noticing isn’t just “AI became a thing” — it’s:
When the story became tradable for regular people.
That’s the true retail tipping point.
Not when the tech exists.
Not when it’s useful.
But when it becomes:
• narratively simple,
• culturally visible, and
• attached to stocks that go straight up.
If you want, next time we can map this exact same pattern onto:
• the internet (late 90s),
• smartphones (2010–2012),
• cloud computing (2014–2016),
• crypto (2017 / 2021).
The cycles rhyme a lot.
AI prompt:
With the announcement today that SpaceX (and xAI will merge, suddenly, it's gotten very, very interesting. Think about this: the Pentagon (DOD), all branches of the US military, NSA, NASA, SpaceX (Spacelink / Starlink) .... the one software company that connects them all? Palantir.
ChatGPT:
Today Elon Musk announced that SpaceX has merged with his AI company xAI, forming a combined entity with an estimated ~$1.25 trillion valuation — and that this consolidated company is aimed at combining space technology, AI, communications platforms, and data infrastructure into a single vertically integrated powerhouse.
Key points from the merger:
SpaceX acquires xAI and subsumes its AI assets (including the Grok chatbot and social platform X) under the SpaceX umbrella.
A strategically stated goal is to build large-scale AI data centers in space — potentially using solar-powered satellites to provide enormous computing capacity without the terrestrial power and cooling constraints of today’s data centers.
The combined company is positioning itself to compete with major cloud + AI players (like Google, OpenAI, Meta, and others) in both compute and deployment infrastructure.
This blurs the lines between space infrastructure, AI compute, and communications in a way few expected.
You mentioned something insightful: SpaceX + xAI intersects the realms of government/military infrastructure, satellite communications, and AI — a territory where Palantir is deeply embedded.
Here’s how Palantir plays into this:
Palantir’s software (such as Gotham and Vantage) is used extensively across Pentagon, Army, intelligence agencies, and allied defense systems to consolidate, analyze, and operationalize massive data streams. They help users from logistics to battlefield insights and AI-assisted decision-making across departments.
Palantir reported significant increases in U.S. government and military contracts, with revenue and forecasted growth supported by deals with the Department of Defense, Army, Navy, and more.
Palantir’s government business alone has grown substantially — and reporting indicates high-value, multi-billion-dollar defense contracts which tie it directly into U.S. national security infrastructure.
There are reports of coalitions of defense tech companies — Palantir, Anduril, SpaceX, OpenAI, and others — bidding for Pentagon contracts together. While those discussions aren’t necessarily formal mergers, they illustrate how these companies are increasingly grouped strategically from a government procurement perspective.
This suggests Palantir isn’t just a standalone software contractor: its data tooling is part of how the U.S. military integrates and operationalizes AI across sensors, satellites, and ground systems.
Let’s map out the rough landscape:
Infrastructure provider (rockets, satellites, Starlink)
AIMING to become a global AI compute backbone
Platform for distributed communications
Has Pentagon ties (Space Force, military contracts)
Positioned for a huge IPO
Data integration and analytics platform
Deeply used by the Pentagon and intelligence community
Enables decision-level AI and data workflows across agencies
Not selling compute hardware, but valuable software layers that sit atop it
So: they aren’t direct competitors.
Rather, they could be different layers of the same machine — if government and commercial defense buyers want end-to-end systems that run from data capture (satellite or sensor networks) → inference and AI (compute) → analysis and decision support (software like Palantir).
That’s a powerful combo: hardware infrastructure + AI compute + operational software.
This merger isn’t just another corporate play — it speaks to broader strategic trends:
SpaceX’s Starlink already serves military connectivity
xAI’s AI pushes computational boundaries
Palantir’s software stitches disparate data into actionable insights
If you imagine a future battlefield, space surveillance, logistics operations, or intelligence fusion center — all of these capacities are increasingly essential and interconnected.
Beyond consumer or enterprise cloud usage, national strategy (AI used in defense, intelligence, security) is a massive and rapidly growing bucket of spending. Palantir is currently one of the principal commercial providers in that space.
Today’s competition isn’t just “GAFA vs. OpenAI” — it’s platform stacks that intertwine physical infrastructure (satellites, networks), compute, models, and operational AI. SpaceX’s move toward space-based data centers and AI computing is an example of pushing the hardware envelope, which could dramatically reshape competitive economics for hyperscale compute.
In that context, a software integrator like Palantir (which turns raw data into decisions) becomes significantly more relevant.
Your instinct that Palantir is uniquely positioned was on point — but it’s not that Palantir currently “connects all those dots” in a single stack by itself. Rather:
Palantir’s software enables data and AI at scale in defense and intelligence
SpaceX/xAI’s merger is building the physical and compute infrastructure for next-generation AI
Together they map onto different layers of how tomorrow’s strategic systems will actually operate
So yes — systemically, we’re talking about AI, defense, space, and data infrastructure all converging. Palantir sits in the software layer that makes sense of data from satellites, sensors, and networks — and today’s SpaceX-xAI deal dramatically reinforces why those layers matter together, even if the companies themselves are separate entities.
Let’s watch how customers like the Pentagon or NASA begin to think about procurement — that’s where these stacks become real.
This is a great case study, because Caterpillar looks like “old industrial America” on the surface, but its energy pivot was neither luck nor sudden. It was slow, board-level, and frankly very unsexy—which is why it worked.
Short answer: CAT began realizing “energy” was a strategic pillar in the late 2000s, made it explicit in the early 2010s, and quietly locked it in during 2015–2020. By the time investors noticed, the heavy lifting was already done.
Let me give you a clean timeline and then answer the luck vs. foresight question.
This is where most people miss the story.
Caterpillar already had:
diesel engines (Cat Engines)
gensets
marine and industrial power systems
But these were treated as adjacent businesses, not the core identity.
Two things changed their internal thinking:
Globalization of energy demand
Mining, oil & gas, and infrastructure all scaled together
Customers didn’t want “machines” — they wanted power + uptime
Margin realization
Engines, power systems, and services had:
longer lifecycles
higher service margins
less cyclicality than construction equipment
By the mid-2000s, internally, CAT already knew:
“Power is stickier than iron.”
The Global Financial Crisis was pivotal.
Construction collapsed.
Mining whipsawed.
But energy demand didn’t disappear — it shifted.
This is when CAT leadership started explicitly talking about:
“Energy & Transportation” as a reporting segment
Lifecycle value
Installed base monetization
Key signal (often overlooked):
CAT began investing heavily in aftermarket, service contracts, and remote monitoring
This only makes sense if you believe power assets will run for decades
This was not luck.
It was defensive strategy informed by pain.
The $8.8B acquisition of Bucyrus (mining equipment) is often cited as a mistake.
But strategically, it taught CAT something critical:
cyclicality kills capital returns
customers value reliability over novelty
energy-adjacent assets survive downturns better
After Bucyrus, CAT:
became much more disciplined on capital allocation
leaned harder into engines, turbines, power systems, and services
This is when the board really internalized the lesson.
This is when CAT stopped hinting and started structuring around energy.
Concrete moves:
Formal Energy & Transportation segment
Expanded natural gas engines
Microgrid solutions
Power for remote/off-grid sites
Marine and rail electrification hybrids
Crucially:
CAT did not frame this as “green” or “ESG.”
They framed it as:
reliability
resilience
fuel optionality
That let them sell to everyone.
By the time:
data centers needed backup power
utilities needed fast-deploy generation
mining electrification accelerated
LNG infrastructure expanded
CAT was already embedded.
To outside investors, it looked like:
“Wow, Caterpillar got lucky with energy.”
Internally, it looked like:
“We’ve been building this for 15 years.”
But also not a single “aha” moment.
This was institutional pattern recognition, not founder genius.
CAT’s advantages:
Long planning horizons
Engineering-first culture
Board comfort with capital intensity
Willingness to be boring while building option value
They didn’t predict the energy transition.
They positioned themselves so that almost any energy future benefits them.
That’s the key.
CAT is quietly becoming:
a beneficiary of data center buildout
a supplier to grid resilience
a player in distributed generation
a services-heavy energy company disguised as an equipment maker
They don’t need AI hype.
They sell power when power is scarce.
In today’s cloud + AI + data center world, that’s not incidental.
Caterpillar didn’t pivot to energy.
They realized:
“Energy was always our highest-quality business — we just hadn’t admitted it yet.”
That realization likely crystallized between 2009 and 2013, and everything since has been execution.
If you want, next time we can compare this to:
GE (what went wrong)
Siemens (what partially worked)
or why CAT’s culture made this possible when others failed
AI prompt:
That is interesting. I had not thought of that. What happened to GE (similar to what happened to Intel)? So, two questions: what went wrong for GE and was it similar for Intel or something completely different?
This is one of those comparisons that looks obvious on the surface (“big American industrial icons stumble”) but turns out to be really instructive once you peel it back. GE and Intel failed in different ways, but they share a deep structural rhyme. Caterpillar avoided both traps, which is why it’s such a useful contrast.
I’ll take them one at a time, then tie them together.
GE didn’t die because it couldn’t build things.
It died because it forgot what its core competence actually was.
GE Capital went from:
supporting industrial sales
to
becoming the profit engine
By the late 1990s and early 2000s:
earnings smoothing mattered more than engineering truth
risk was misunderstood, not measured
the board got addicted to predictability
This broke the feedback loop between reality and reported performance.
GE became:
aviation
power
healthcare
oil & gas
finance
media
appliances
Each business was defensible.
The system was not.
The CEO role became:
“Allocate capital across black boxes”
That works—until it doesn’t.
Power turbines, jet engines, and grid infrastructure:
have decades-long horizons
require brutal honesty about reliability and maintenance
GE leadership kept applying:
quarterly targets
financial engineering
cost pressure
Reality eventually asserted itself (see: power division collapse).
GE’s famous management system turned from:
talent development
into
political survival
Bad news didn’t travel upward.
That’s always fatal in industrial companies.
Intel’s failure looks different—but it rhymes.
Intel lost process leadership and didn’t know how to live without it.
Intel believed:
“We are our process.”
That was true—until it wasn’t.
When they fell behind:
they couldn’t outsource without identity damage
they couldn’t admit delay without credibility loss
TSMC ate their lunch while Intel argued with itself.
Intel was brilliant at:
optimizing known architectures
extracting yield improvements
They were bad at:
disruptive change
killing sacred cows
reorganizing around new constraints
This is deadly in semiconductors.
Fabs require:
perfect execution
constant reinvestment
external discipline
Intel had:
legacy customers
internal politics
government entanglements
That’s a rough mix.
Like GE, Intel reached a point where:
the CEO’s job was survival, not vision
every move upset a constituency
strategic optionality vanished
By the time Pat Gelsinger arrived, the game was already constrained.
GE and Intel both suffered from identity lock-in.
GE thought it was:
“The world’s best managed company”
Intel thought it was:
“The world’s best chipmaker because of process leadership”
When those identities broke, neither had:
fast feedback loops
cultural humility
structural escape hatches
Caterpillar did.
CAT never confused:
what it builds
with
why customers need it
GE and Intel both did.
CAT always knew:
“Our job is uptime, reliability, and service—whatever the energy source or machine.”
That let them evolve without existential crisis.
No—but they rhyme.
Same ending mechanism:
Reality catches up faster than the organization can adapt.
The lesson isn’t “don’t get big.”
It’s:
Never let identity outrun feedback.
Once a company can’t hear bad news, can’t pivot without self-harm, or can’t admit the ground shifted—it’s already late.
Caterpillar stayed boring, honest, and close to physics.
GE and Intel drifted into abstractions.
That difference explains almost everything.
If you want, next time we can look at:
Microsoft’s near-miss (Ballmer era)
IBM’s slow survival
or whether today’s AI giants are drifting toward GE-like risk